RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-ARBITRATION AGREEMENT-AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT Is To BE GIVEN FULL EFFECT By FEDERAL
COURTS EXCEPT WHERE PUBLIC POLICY OR EQUITY DICTATE OTHERWISE.

In February, 1969, after two years of negotiations in the United States and
Europe, respondent' and petitioner2 signed a contract which transferred petitioner's ownership of three European cosmetics firms and their respective
trademarks. 3 The contract stipulated that any disputes arising out of the transfer agreement would be arbitrated before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France.4 Alleging that the trademarks of the transferred businesses were substantially encumbered, respondent ignored the arbitration
clause and brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for damages and other relief. Respondent contended that
petitioner's allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations violated § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 and Rule lOb-51 promulgated thereunder. Peti-

tioner moved to dismiss the action7 or alternatively to stay the action pending
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the transfer contract. Respondent in turn
opposed this motion and sought a preliminary injunction restraining the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. The District Court denied petitioner's motion and issued a preliminary order preventing petitioner from commencing
arbitration proceedings. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision.8 The Supreme Court granted petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari.' Held, reversed and remanded. In the context of an international commercial transaction, the agreement of the parties to arbitrate any dispute arising
out of a breach of their contract is to be respected and enforced by the Federal

I The respondent is Alberto-Culver Co., an American company incorporated in Delaware and
with its principal office in Illinois. It manufactures and distributes toiletries in the United States
and abroad.
2 The petitioner, Fritz Scherk, is a German citizen residing in Switzerland. Petitioner was the
owner of the three European businesses sold to Alberto-Culver.
I The firms involved were two German toiletries corporations, Firma Ludwig Scherk (FLS)
and Lodeva, and a Liechtenstein corporation, Scherk Establissement Vaouz (SEV). Petitioner
expressly warranted that he was the sole owner of the enterprises and that their respective trademarks were unencumbered.
I It was further stipulated that the laws of Illinois would govern the agreement, its interpretation
and performance.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78J (1970).
' 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1972).
1 The petitioner moved to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. He also
asserted that the court was a forum non conveniens.
9 484 F.2d 611 (1973).
9 414 U.S. 1156 (1974).
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Courts in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 192510
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Arbitration has deep historical roots." Although the practice has been widely
used throughout our nation's history, American courts have tended to regard

agreements to arbitrate and contractual stipulations of fora with considerable
suspicion. The nineteenth and early twentieth-century courts generally struck
down these agreements on the basis of public policy or "principle."' ' 3 The

motivation underlying this hostility appeared to be the courts' fear of encroachments on judicial power." The "ouster doctrine," as this policy of the courts

came to be known, stood preeminent into the 1920's. 15

In response to this judicial hostility Congress mandated the enforcement of
general arbitration clauses with the enactment of the Arbitration Act of 1925.16
The Act directed the courts to stay proceedings which involve an issue "referable to arbitration" 7 when (1) there has been a written agreement for such
arbitration and (2) one of the parties to that agreement moves for a stay of
1*9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970). The Act states that an arbitration clause "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." Id. at § 2.
1 See generally J.H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918); Sayre, The
Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928); W. Jones, History of
Commercial Arbitration in England and the United States: A Summary View in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ARBITRATION 127 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
12 See S. Jones, HistoricalDevelopment of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12
MINN. L. REv. 251 (1928). For a discussion of arbitration in British North America, see generally
Jones, Three Centuries of Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 193.
13 See, e.g., Nute v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856), for an outstanding state
court's treatment; Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874), for the United States Supreme
Court's approach.
11 For short discussions of judicial hostility to agreements purporting to oust a court of
jurisdiction, see 45 YALE L.J. 1150 (1936); 22 CORNELL L.Q. 456 (1937); 6A CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 1445 (1962).

5 See, e.g., Sudbury v. Ambi Verwaltung etc., 213 App. Div. 94, 210 N.Y.S. 164 (Ist Dep't
1925) (Court refuses to require U.S. citizen to litigate in German courts); Sliosberg v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 217 App. Div. 685, 217 N.Y.S. 226 (1st Dep't 1926) (same; Russian courts). Though
the "ouster doctrine" reached its zenith in the 1920's, it still showed signs of life as late as 1959.
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed,
359 U.S. 180 (1959). In Carbon Black the Court stated: "[Algreements in advance of controversy
whose object is to 'oust' the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy." Id. at 300.
" 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970) [hereinafter the Act].
, The submission of factual issues was considered an issue "referable to arbitration" while all
legal questions were to be resolved by the courts. See, e.g., Carr v. American Ins. Co., 152 F. Supp.
700 (D.C. Tenn. 1957). However, fraud in the inducement was also held to be a proper subject for
arbitration. E.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 221 F. Supp.
364 (D. La. 1963); Hamilton Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), affd 408 F.2d 606 (2nd Cir. 1969).
Courts were careful to sever the arbitration clause from the rest of the agreement, holding that
claims of fraud regarding the clause itself were not subject to arbitration. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Keystone Floors, Inc., 306 F.2d 560 (3rd Cir. 1962); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemicals Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Harman Elec. Const. Co. v.
Consolidated Eng'r Co., 347 F. Supp. 392 (D. Del. 1972).
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the proceedings until arbitration had been perfected." The policy behind the
Arbitration Act" has generally been followed by a majority of the courts,10 but
a vocal minority, particularly those of the Fifth Circuit, long continued to apply
the Arbitration Act with reservations engendered by the ouster doctrine.2 '
As American courts allowed greater freedom of contract with regard to
arbitration and choice-of-forum agreements, in international commercial

transactions, there emerged a policy of recognizing these agreements as valid
if they were reasonable in view of the circumstances of the case.2 2 In 1955, the
Second Circuit, in Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd.13
upheld a forum-selection clause which gave jurisdiction to the Swedish courts
over any dispute arising between the American and Swedish firms involved.
The court acknowledged that the parties should not be allowed to oust a court's
jurisdiction but held that, if by a preliminary ruling the court finds the clause
reasonable under the circumstances of the case, it may properly decline jurisdiction in favor of the stipulated forum. 4 The burden of proving that the clause
was unreasonable was placed on the plaintiff.n

Is
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1970) states that "[i]f there is a legitimate arbitration clause, the court in which
a suit is pending, shall on application of one of the parties, stay the trial until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement."
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) further provides that "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure . . . of
another to arbitrate may petition any United States district court .
for an order directing that
such an arbitration proceed."
" The Act was designed to allow parties to avoid "the costliness and delays of litigation," and
to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts .
H.R. REP. No.
96, 68th Cong., Ist. Sess. 1 (1924).
20See, e.g., Danielsen v. Entre Rios R.C., 22 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1927) (Arbitration Act allows
court to stay proceeding until foreign arbitration is completed, while reserving power to enter
decree on judgment); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2nd Cir.
1942) (Principle upheld but arbitration excused when wartime conditions made arbitration in
London impossible); Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944);
Mannesmann Rohrleitungsbau v. S.S. Bernhard Howald, 254 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Stay
pending arbitration in the Netherlands); Oregon-Pacific Forest Prods. Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co.,
248 F. Supp. 903 (D. Ore. 1965) (Stay pending arbitration in Japan); Island Territory of Curaqao
v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22 Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958).
n RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 558 (1932), states that choice-of-forum clauses are invalid
when they constitute unreasonable limits on a right of action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 80 (1971) essentially restates the reasonable-

ness doctrine: "The parties' agreement as to the place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial
jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable."
224 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
U Id. at 808. While stating that it relied on the majority view, the court actually adopted Judge
Clark's concurring view in Cerro De Passco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990
(2nd Cir. 1951), which would have upheld the forum-selection clause under the circumstances of
the case rather than on the broader grounds of judicial discretion. The factors which led the Muller
court to declare the choice-of-forum clause reasonable included: the vessel had been constructed
in Sweden and was Swedish-owned; the crew was entirely Swedish; it was undisputed that the
Swedish courts were no more restrictive on the libellant's recovery than American maritime courts.
" The burden of proof in forum non conveniens cases is normally placed on the party seeking

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[VOL. 5: 257

The Supreme Court in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co."' applied the
reasonableness doctrine in holding that the party seeking to avoid a forumselection clause must show that enforcement would be unreasonable, unfair, or
unjust." The remoteness of the forum was not to be viewed as the determinative
factor when the parties had deliberately chosen a neutral ground. The choice
represented certainty in that the parties, both multinational in operation, could
otherwise bring suit in the courts of any one of numerous nations. s The Court
also found it to be significant that the chosen forum in London had had considerable experience in settling commercial disputes.2 The Court limited Bremen's
application to agreements untainted by fraud;"0 however, other courts have
held that fraud in the inducement is a proper subject for arbitration.3 ' The
importance of Bremen lies in the recognition by the Court that businessmen,
dealing openly and without coercion, should be allowed to stand by their rea32
sonable contractual selection of a judicial forum.
The majority opinion in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.3 stresses similar
international considerations. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority of five,
points out that imposing unnecessary judicial restraints on arbitration agreements would be a "parochial" approach to the resolution of disputes in international commerce.U He characterizes a policy whereby American courts refuse
to honor an international agreement to arbitrate as a "dicey atmosphere of
such a legal no-man's-land."" Justice Stewart does not specifically refer to the
reasonableness doctrine in Scherk, but he quotes with approval the language
of Bremen that a forum clause should control unless there are strong reasons
3
for it to be set aside.
One apparently strong reason for setting aside the arbitration clause is
stressed by dissenting Justice Douglas."7 Since the transaction between
to change plaintiff's choice of forum. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08
(1946). Note, Choice of Forum, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 145 150 (1973), argues that the shift indicates
a judicial solicitude for sanctity of contract and provides for "maximum certainty in cases where
there is no suggestion of unfair bargaining."
- 407 U.S. I (1972).
2 Id. at 15.
n Id. at 11-12, 17.
2 Id. at 17. The tribunal was to be the London Court of Justice.
o Id. at 15.
' See note 18 supra.
n 407 U.S. 1, 11-12, 17 (1972). Agreements to arbitrate can be considered special types of
forum selection clauses.
" Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) [hereinafter Scherk].
" Id. at 519. This statement paraphrases the Bremen approach that invalidating such agreements would be evidence of a "parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved in our courts
under our laws . . . .We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
3

417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).

" Id. at 518.
" Id. at 521.
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Alberto-Culver and Scherk involves an exchange of securities," Justice Douglas cites Wilko v. Swan"5 as the controlling case. In Wilko the Court held that
an agreement to arbitrate could not prevent a buyer of securities from seeking

a judicial remedy in a federal court under the Securities Act of 1933." In
Justice Douglas' opinion this Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934",
are intended to protect American investors, large as well as small, by providing
judicial direction in the settlement of securities disputes.'" Furthermore, this
protection is of Congressional origin, and is not subject to waiver by the parties." Justice Douglas recognizes the.importance of arbitration for transac-

tions not involving securities, but he insists that "American standards of fairness in security dealings (must) govern thedestinies of American investors until
Congress changes these standards.""

The majority, on the other hand, distinguishes the Wilko decision by showing
that the "special right" to bring suit which the Court in Wilko found to be
significant was not present in either § 10(b) or Rule lOb-5, both of which merely
create an implied cause of action.'" The protection for investors which could
not be waived under the 1933 act'" has no exact counterpart in § 10(b) or Rule
at 516 n. 9. Presumably because the issue was not expressly raised by either party, the
" Id.
Court states that the question "was not briefed or argued in this Court." Justice Douglas, id. at
525, points out that the court of appeals held that securities within the meaning of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 are involved here. 484 F.2d 611, 615 (1973). Justice Douglas further states
that respondent's brief is based on the premise that "securities" are at issue.
n 346 U.S. 427 (1953) [hereinafter Wilko].
" 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. §§77n, 77, 77aa (1970); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953). Justice Douglas
rejects the notion that Wilko applies only to protect small investors. He asserts that "the Rules
when the giants play are the same as when the pygmies enter the market." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974).
Id. at 527.
" Id. at 528.
,5Id. at 513. This argument by the Court is tenuous at best. Rule lOb-5 was first construed as
creating implied civil liability in Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 23 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947),
supplemented 87 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Several theories have been articulated to support
the private right of action under lOb-5. The first is the tort theory which is basically that the
violation of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 286
(1965). The second is the "void contract" theory. The premise is that the 1934 Act itself grants a
private remedy under § 29(b), "every contract made in violation [of the statute and rule thereunder]
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
shall be void." A third theory is that espoused in J.I.
which dealt with an alleged violation of the proxy regulation. The Court states that:
It appears clear that private parties have a right under § 27 to bring suit for violations
of § 14(a) of the Securities Act. Indeed, this section specifically grants the appropriate
District Court jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created" under the Act.
See also, Dystra, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 207; Sussman, Use ofRule
lOb-5 as a Remedy for Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations, 22 Bus. LAW. 193 (1967);
Klein, Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Securities Investors Under SEC Rule lOb-5,
20 U. MIAMi L. REV. 81 (1965); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent, 57 NEV. U.L. REV. 627 (1963).
4 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
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lOb-5, the bases for Alberto-Culver's original suit.' 7 Even conceding Justice
Douglas' point that the acts of 1933 and 1934 do prohibit the removal of cases
involving securities transactions from federal courts, Stewart declares that the
question of whether Alberto-Culver's purchase of Sherk's business is a security
transaction is irrelevant simply because that question is not before the Court."
The crucial factor in Scherk is the international character of the agreement.
This factor introduces considerations and policies significantly different from
those controlling in Wilko." The chimerical advantage which a party would
have in resorting to suit in an American court, contrary to an express agreement to arbitrate, would vanish when foreign parties would likewise seek to
protect their interests by suing in the courts of another nation. The purpose of
arbitration and forum-selection agreements then is to obviate the necessity for
such a race to a forum and to stabilize agreements in international trade and
commerce.50
It was not contended that Alberto-Culver was coerced into agreeing to the
Paris forum. The neutrality of the forum and Alberto-Culver's relative sophistication in the international marketplace suggest otherwise. Had the Court
agreed with Alberto-Culver that American businessmen might disregard with
impunity their contracts to arbitrate, this pronouncement would stand as an
insult to foreign legal systems and a repudiation of the freedom to contract.
Instead the Court has determined that parties to an international commercial
transaction are to be held to their arbitration agreement where the agreement
is concluded fairly and violates no overriding policies of law or equity. The
Court left unanswered the question of what effect the United Nations' Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards5 would
have on such international contracts. However, the Court did find that the
acceptance of the Convention on Arbitral Awards by Congress 2 was strongly
persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent with the present decision.
Based on the facts of the case, the result in Scherk is correct. However, it
must be noted that the Scherk decision, despite its apparently sweeping implications, is "not properly a test case of the importance which the Court attaches
to commercial certainty."" Nor did the choice of forum make it impossible
47
"

417 U.S. 506, 514 (1974).
See note 38 supra.

" Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Cf.Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200, 206 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) in which the court states: "[Tlhe
provision of § 10(b) reaches beyond the territorial limits of the United States and applies when a
violation of the rules is injurious to American investors." See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-39 (2nd Cir. 1972); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473
F.2d 515, 523-28 (8th Cir. 1973). The majority in Scherk appears determined to avoid an in-depth
analysis of the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It is true that
Wilko does not contain international considerations, but the policy of the 1934 Act does.
- 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
51Dec. 29, 1970, 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997.
32 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
5 Note, Choice of Forum, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 145, 157 (1973).
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for the American party to arbitrate. The Court's desire for certainty in international commerce will face its severest test in cases where relatively unsophisti-

cated, small investors enter into agreements, which contain arbitration clauses,
and the forum is either patently inconvenient for the United States party, or
there is a sharper conflict with the public policy underlying the remedial legislation which the Court cannot in good faith distinguish away.54 Considering the
merits of such individual cases will mean weighing factors not present in
Scherk. It is thus quite foreseeable that Scherk's influence and application will

be much narrower than the Court's language indicates.
James David Dunham
J. Stephen Schuster
14 Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Scherk expresses concern for the perplexing
problems which "off-shore funds" will present under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 526 (1974). Justice Douglas argues that remedial legislation,
such as the Securities Exchange Act, is rendered useless when foreign corporations or funds, unlike
domestic defendants, nullify investor protection laws by use of arbitration clauses which send
defrauded American investors to the uncertainty of litigation in foreign forums, or, if those investors cannot afford to arbitrate their claim in a distant forum, to no remedy at all. Id. at 533.

